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Abstract—Public awareness regarding security aspects in the
Internet of Things (IoT) is currently rising due to regular media
presence of various IoT-related security breaches. One of the
major weaknesses of IoT devices is the absence of appropriate
mechanisms for firmware and configuration updates. In addition,
improved security concepts often result in poor usability which
discourages users from relying on these concepts. Therefore, in
this paper, we present an easy-to-use NFC-based configuration
approach for IoT devices that is secured by appropriate security
measures in software and hardware. Since industrial usage of
such a configuration approach entails different requirements
than home usage, we present and compare three different
configuration processes. The applicability of our approach is
demonstrated by two prototypical implementations, as well as
a detailed security analysis. We also show that the imposed
overhead due to the implemented security measures is negligible
for most configuration updates.
Index Terms—Near Field Communication, Internet of Things,
Security, Configuration.
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURITY aspects of the Internet of Things (IoT) andthe lack thereof are a major issue due to the high number
of potentially vulnerable devices. Although IoT devices are
often resource constraint, they are still an enticing target for
attackers since these devices are often used in botnets [1],
[2]. In addition to that, each device in the IoT is equipped
with some sort of sensor. This fact also increases the risk of
attacks since adversaries may be interested in the provided
sensor data, especially of Industrial IoT (IIoT) devices.
Various studies show that between 10% and 40% of all
scanned IoT devices are vulnerable to attacks because of
issues such as using standard settings as well as username
and passwords [3], [4] or due to exposing their configuration
interface to the Internet [5]. Therefore, we consider the
secured and easy-to-use configuration of IoT devices as a
major gap in current research.
Regarding the configuration of IoT devices, we consider
two application domains that entail different requirements in
terms of security, hardware requirements, and usability.
(i) Industrial: Industrial usage of IoT devices requires
high levels of security since malicious devices might interrupt
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a production process, reveal confidential information, or
even cause physical damage and threaten human lives [6].
So-called smart factories [7] utilize a large number of IIoT
devices for sensing the production process. Maintenance that
involves configuration updates due to updated production-
or security-requirements is essential in such an environment.
By introducing a secured and easy-to-use configuration
interface, even untrained staff can perform firmware updates
or configuration changes. However, it is essential to protect
the confidentiality and authenticity of configuration data
as employees applying the configuration updates could be
potential adversaries. Since in industrial settings the security
aspect is of utmost importance, other factors such as the
necessity for additional hardware components that increase
the security can be seen as negligible.
(ii) Personal: Configuration approaches for IoT devices
used in home automation or smart home [8] contexts need
to provide good usability and low cost. However, also in a
smart home context, configuration and firmware updates for
devices need to be performed using a secured configuration
interface. Similar to industrial use-cases, also in a smart
home context the configuration data must be secured against
various attacks for sustaining the proper functionality of the
configured devices.
Independent of the domain in which IoT devices are
used, configuration updates need to be performed in every
phase of the device’s lifecycle. Fig. 1 shows a typical IoT
device configuration lifecycle that involves three major
configuration phases: initial configuration, reconfiguration,
and deletion of configuration data if an IoT device is
sold or discarded. While the initial configuration might
be performed in a controlled environment by the device
manufacturer, all other reconfigurations of the IoT device
will be performed in the potential presence of adversaries.
Based on these observations, we extend and adopt the
NFC-based configuration approach [9] presented at the
IEEE International Conference on RFID. In addition to the
configuration approach presented in that paper, we present
different implementations that are tailored to the needs of
certain application domains.
Contributions. For a configuration interface that is suitable
for a wide range of IoT devices, we identify the following
requirements:
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Fig. 1. Necessary configuration phases during an IoT device’s lifecycle.
Req1 Configuration changes for IoT devices should be possi-
ble in a secured and easy-to-use manner.
Req2 The configuration interface must be protected against
remote attacks and misuse.
Req3 Implemented security features should provide high us-
ability such that users acceptance is improved.
Req4 Potential hardware extensions must be suitable for
legacy devices as well as for newly developed devices.
Req5 Device configuration must be possible in every phase of
an IoT device’s lifecycle.
Req6 The configuration approach should be suitable for in-
dustrial as well as home usage.
Req7 There should be no or minimal additional hardware
required to perform configuration updates.
In this paper, we present an NFC-based configuration
approach is capable of fulfilling these seven requirements.
The presented approach provides data confidentiality,
integrity, and authenticity while being intuitive to use. To
account for different application domains such as industrial
usage or home usage, we present different implementations
of our approach that optimizes usability, and security for
the respective domain. The implemented security features
comprise a secured configuration protocol as well as a
hardware extension that includes tamper resistant hardware to
further increase provided security. This hardware extension is
applicable for legacy and new IoT devices and enables device
configuration in every phase of an IoT device’s lifecycle. To
highlight the applicability of our configuration approach, we
also present a novel smart factory inspired use case which
we used as a demonstrator for our prototype.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: In Section II we give background information on
methods and technologies included in our approach and dis-
cuss related work. Section III defines our system model and
lists corresponding assumptions. We then present our NFC-
based configuration approach in Section IV and compare three
different realizations of that approach. The security features
implemented in software and hardware are then presented in
Section V. In Section VI we show a prototypical implemen-
tation of our approach that was also demonstrated using a
smart factory environment. The evaluation of our approach
that includes a security analysis is discussed in Section VII.
Future work and a conclusion are given Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Near Field Communication (NFC)
NFC is a contactless communication standard based on
RFID technology that operates at a radio frequency of
13.56MHz [10], [11]. The typical communication range of
NFC is approximately 10 cm while supporting bit rates that
are multiples of 106 kbps (up to 848 kbps). Although the
communication range of NFC is limited, a range of approxi-
mately 10m for active and 1m for passive devices should be
considered as a rule of thumb for possible eavesdropping [12].
In addition to eavesdropping, also other types of attacks such
as man-in-the-middle, denial-of-service or replay attacks can
be applied to unsecured NFC communication [13]. Despite
these potential issues, NFC is used in various domains due
to its intuitive device coupling mechanism that is easy to
understand for humans [14]. The mobile payment sector [15]
and mobile ticketing applications [16] are the most prominent
applications of NFC; however, NFC is also seen as a future
building block for the IoT to link the real world with the digital
world [17].
B. Symmetric Cryptography
Symmetric Cryptography requires the same cryptographic
key to be used for data encryption and decryption. Due to
this, the used key is considered as shared secret between
communicating parties and thus, needs to be kept private. The
most widely used symmetric cryptographic algorithm is the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [18]. Algorithms for
symmetric cryptography such as AES are capable of providing
data confidentiality. In order to also provide data integrity and
authenticity, symmetric cryptography needs to be combined
with other security measures, such as Message Authentication
Codes (MAC).
Authenticated Encryption (AE) combines symmetric cryp-
tography with MACs in a secured way such that data integrity
and authenticity can be provided in addition to data confiden-
tiality [19]. AES provides specialized modes of operation such
as AES-CCM or AES-GCM that are capable of providing AE.
C. Tamper Resistant Hardware
Cryptographic algorithms such as AES can be implemented
efficiently in hardware with respect to performance, power
consumption, and size requirements [25]. However, such hard-
ware components might leak information that can be used to
reveal used keys or other information [26]. In addition to these
so-called side-channel attacks, also invasive physical attacks
can be used to reveal confidential information [27]. Tamper
resistant hardware [28] such as security controllers (SCs) can
be used to provide protected execution environments as well
as secured data storage that mitigate side-channel and physical
attacks. However, since SCs are not as powerful as general
purpose controllers or dedicated hardware components, split-
ting the execution environment into a secured world and a
normal world is suggested [29]. This splitting principle by
implementing SCs as external hardware modules that can then
be combined with general purpose CPUs.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK. THE CHARACTERISTICS REGARDING ARBITRARY PAYLOAD, PROVIDED SECURITY, SUITABILITY FOR PERSONAL
USE, AND SUITABILITY FOR INDUSTRIAL USE ARE EVALUATED.
Related
Work Remarks
Arbitrary
Payload
Provided
Security
Personal
Use
Industrial
Use
[20], [21] Device pairing information is exchanged; no security is provided. 7 7 7 7
[22] Reprogramming CRFID firmware over the air. No security provided. 7 7 7 7
[23] NFC peer-to-peer framework that allows arbitrary data to be transmitted. 3 7 3 7
[24] Arbitrary configuration data possible; initial configuration not secured. 3 7 / 3 3 7
[9] Arbitrary configuration data possible; hardware and software security. 3 3 3 7 / 3
This
work.
Arbitrary configuration data possible; hardware and software security;
multiple configuration mechanisms supported. 3 3 3 3
D. NFC-based Device Configuration
Although NFC is considered as an ideal technology for
device pairing [12], using it for IoT device configuration is
not that common. Most device pairing solutions (e.g. [20],
[21]) have in common that only pairing information can be
transmitted and that no security measures are integrated. Wu et
al. [22] present an approach for reprogramming computational
RFID (CRFID) tags over the air. The authors propose to
use the Electronic Product Code (EPC) protocol to update
the firmware of passive CRFID tags. The drawbacks of the
presented approach that only complete firmware images can
be flashed as well as missing security features. Serfass and
Yoshigoe [23] present a framework for NFC communication
in wireless sensor networks. This framework allows arbitrary
data to be transferred using NFC but does not provide security
measures. Haase et al. [24] propose to NFC-enabled mobile
phones for NFC-based sensor and actuator configuration in
smart home contexts. The authors also discuss security mea-
sures. However, the initial device configuration is unencrypted,
and no key update mechanism is provided. Ulz et al. [9]
present a QR and NFC-based hybrid configuration approach
that implements security measures in hardware and software.
This approach is further extended in this paper such that
different update mechanisms are supported to suit personal and
industrial usage scenarios. Also, an automated key derivation
process is included. The discussed related work is compared
with the approach presented in this paper in Table I.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
When designing a configuration interface for IoT devices,
we are faced with the following three problems:
1) Configuration data for IoT devices might contain con-
fidential information, especially when considering IIoT
devices. This configuration data needs to be transferred
using an untrusted channel including potential adver-
saries that eavesdrop or manipulate the transferred data.
2) IoT and IIoT devices might be operated in unsupervised
environments, thus configuration data needs to be stored
at the device such that confidential information cannot
be extracted, even if adversaries have unlimited physical
access to the device under attack.
Fig. 2. System model we assume for IoT device configuration.
3) The configuration interface might be subjected to mis-
use, both unintentional and intentional.
To mitigate these problems, the configuration approach we
are presenting in this paper is based on the system model
shown in Fig.2 that comprises the following three entities:
IoT Device: The device that needs to be configured. There
is no limitation on the number of devices; we generally assume
n IoT devices in our system model.
Configuration Device: The mobile device used to transfer
configuration data to the IoT device. We also do not limit the
number of configuration devices in our model; therefore, we
assume m such configuration devices.
Configuration Back-End: The back-end is responsible
for administrating all configurations that are done using our
presented approach. This means that the back-end needs to
keep track of all configuration changes. Therefore, we assume
one configuration back-end in our system model.
Based on our system model, we assume the configuration
back-end that operates as a global configuration storage to
be trustworthy and sufficiently secured against any kind of
attack. We further assume that all configuration changes must
be initiated and authorized by this back-end. Thus, the back-
end has knowledge of device configurations from all devices
administrated by that back-end. Regarding configuration data,
no assumption concerning the content is made. That is, we
assume configuration data to contain non-confidential informa-
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t e m p _ t h r e s h o l d : 0x5D
s a m p l i n g _ r a t e : 0x01
w i f i _ k e y : 0x778D9FE1325BAB9811
Fig. 3. Example configuration that contains non-confidential information as
well as confidential information.
IoT DeviceConfig Device
Get Device ID
Device ID
Back-End
Get Configuration
Configuration
Update Configuraiton
Accept / Reject
1
3
2
Fig. 4. Sequence of NFC communication for IoT device configuration.
tion such as temperature thresholds or sampling rates, as well
as confidential information such as keys or WiFi passwords.
An exemplary configuration is shown in Fig. 3.
IV. CONFIGURATION MECHANISMS
Depending on the domain in which IoT devices are used,
different requirements regarding a configuration interface can
be defined. For example, protecting confidential information
is of utmost importance for devices used in industrial settings.
For IoT devices used by private persons, a configuration
approach should be as easy-to-use as possible and should
not require any costly additional hardware. Therefore, we
present three different configuration mechanisms supported by
our approach. Each of these mechanisms provides different
advantages and disadvantages that we are going to discuss.
All three mechanisms implement the security measures that
are discussed in Section V. However, for simplicity, we only
discuss the principle process of each configuration mechanism
in this section.
A. NFC-based Configuration
In the NFC-based configuration mechanisms, NFC and a
wireless data connection are used during device configuration
according to the protocol shown in Fig. 4. The protocol
comprises the following three steps: 1 The configuration
device queries the IoT device for its identifier using NFC.
2 Using this device ID, a configuration is fetched from
the configuration back-end. In this case, we assume that
the device is managed by that back-end and that a new
configuration that needs to be applied is available. 3 If a
configuration for that given device is available; it is transferred
to the IoT device again using NFC.
Advantages/Disadvantages
+ This mechanism is easy to use. The device to configure
is automatically identified, and the corresponding config-
uration is fetched. Due to the fact that users only need
to bring the mobile configuration device with a working
Payload
WiFi, 3G, 4G
NFC
Payload
Payload
PropA = value1
PropB = value2
PropC = value3 IoT
Device
Fig. 5. Hybrid configuration approach: On the left hand side, configuration
data is fetched from the back-end using a QR code. On the right hand side,
the configuration is transfered to the IoT device using NFC.
data connection close to the IoT device, this approach is
very well suited for remote support.
– Active data connection is required to fetch configuration
data which might not be possible in industrial settings.
Also, initial data such as a symmetric key needs to be
synchronized between IoT device and configuration back-
end (e.g. by manufacturer).
B. NFC and QR code based Configuration
As third configuration mechanism, we propose a QR-code
and NFC-based hybrid configuration approach [9]. The prin-
ciple of that approach is shown in Fig. 5. As can be seen
there, QR-codes are used to transfer configuration data from
the configuration back-end to the mobile configuration device,
while NFC is used to transfer the configuration data from
the mobile configuration device to the IoT device. Due to
the limited maximum payload of a QR code [30] and to
support different usage scenarios, we propose the following
two different modes of operation:
1) The complete configuration payload is stored in the
QR code, which allows a maximum payload of roughly
2900 bytes of data. Therefore, we denote this type as
inline QR code. Inline QR codes do not require the
mobile configuration device to have an active network
connection. Thus, these QR codes can be distributed and
used where no working network is available.
2) If the configuration data is larger than the maximum
payload of 2900 bytes, only an URL pointing to the
configuration stored at the back-end is included in the
QR code. The mobile configuration device then needs
to fetch the configuration data from the back-end, as in
the previous two mechanisms. We denote this type of
QR code as URL QR code.
Advantages/Disadvantages
+ This mechanism is easy to use. In addition to that, if
the inline mode is used, no active network connection
is required when configuring devices. The inline mode
allows using this approach in situations where no working
network connection is available. QR codes can also easily
be distributed by paper, for instance, by including the
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF PRESENTED CONFIGURATION MECHANISMS.
NFC-
based
Hybrid
Inline
Hybrid
URL
Location
Aware
Device ID read 3 7 7 3
Works offline 7 3 3/7 7
Configuration size unlimited 3 7 3 3
Suited for remote support 3 3 3 7
Complex back-end upkeep 7 7 7 3
Suited for personal use 3 3 3 7
Suited for industrial use 3 3 3 3
Camera required 7 3 3 7
Wireless interface required 3 7 3 3
Infrastructure required 7 7 7 3
initial configuration of a device inside the packaging the
device is sold in. Also, as shown in Fig. 5, configurations
can be directly downloaded from the monitor where a
configuration is edited.
– The mobile configuration device needs to have a working
camera in order to scan QR codes. Also, this mech-
anism potentially favors potential user errors since the
user needs to be aware which configurations need to be
downloaded beforehand when using the inline mode.
C. Location-Aware Configuration
The second implemented configuration mechanism does
not require the device to identify itself. Instead, localization
mechanisms are used to determine the mobile configuration
device’s position and the closest administrated IoT device. As
soon as the configuration process is initiated by the user, the
corresponding configuration is fetched from the configuration
back-end as in the NFC-based approach. However, instead of
requesting a configuration based on the IoT device’s ID, the
estimated coordinates of the mobile configuration device are
sent to the configuration back-end. The back-end then replies
with the most probable device configuration that is then sent
to the IoT device using NFC.
Advantages/Disadvantages
+ This mechanism is easy to use. The device to configure is
automatically identified, and the corresponding configu-
ration is fetched. Due to using localization to identify the
corresponding IoT device, NFC communication between
IoT device and mobile communication device are reduced
to a minimum.
– Active data connection is required to fetch configuration
data which might not be possible in industrial settings.
Also, the configuration back-end needs to be configured
such that the location of each administrated device is
known to the back-end. While outdoor localization using
GPS might be accurate and easy, indoor localization is
an ongoing research topic [31]. Also, indoor localization
NFC Enhancement
General Purpose 
Controller
Security
Controller
Sensor/
Actuator
Interface
Network
Interface
NFC
Interface
Fig. 6. NFC Enhancement that can be integrated into any IoT device.
requires an infrastructure that is used to calculate the
mobile configuration device’s position.
In our prototypical implementation, we used a Received Sig-
nal Strength Indicator (RSSI) based trilateration algorithm [32]
relying on wireless access points. The localization quality
using such an approach strongly depends on factors such as
fading, obstacles, or the temperature [33]. However, in our
setting, we were able to achieve accuracies of less than 1m
which will be sufficient for most settings.
D. Comparison
Since all three previously presented mechanisms have dif-
ferent advantages and disadvantages, we compare them in
Table II regarding their suitability for different usage scenarios
of IoT devices. As can be seen there, no algorithm is suited
best for all scenarios; thus, the applied mechanism needs to
be chosen based on the context in which IoT devices need to
be configured.
V. SECURITY MECHANISMS
A. NFC Enhancement
In order to allow new as well as retrofit IoT devices to be
equipped with the proposed NFC configuration interface, we
present a hardware extension suitable for these two types of
devices. This so-called NFC Enhancement provides a number
of interfaces for different purposes:
Sensor/Actuator Interface: This interface is used to con-
nect sensors and actuators that are used by the IoT device with
the NFC enhancement component.
Network Interface: This interface is used to connect the
IoT device with a network. The IoT device’s core functionality
is accessible through this interface.
NFC Interface: This interface is used for device
configuration. The NFC interface will also be used to
harvest energy during the configuration process such that no
additional power source is necessary for device configuration.
A concept of the NFC enhancement component containing
all three interfaces is shown in Fig. 6. The component includes
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two controllers, a general purpose controller and a SC. Due to
including two controllers, responsibilities can be split perfectly
according to the capabilities of both controllers. On the one
hand, the general purpose controller provides interfaces to
sensors, actuators, and to the network which requires com-
putational power. In addition, computational expensive data
aggregation, manipulation, and processing can be done by the
general purpose controller. The less powerful SC, on the other
hand, offers a secured execution environment and protected
storage. Cryptographic operations are executed by the SC,
and confidential information is stored in the SC’s protected
storage. The SC also offers an NFC interface that is used for
IoT device configuration. This NFC interface is also capable
of harvesting energy from an NFC field such that the SC
does not require any additional power source. Due to this, IoT
devices can be configured at any time, for instance, during the
manufacturing process without attaching any power source.
In addition, SCs in our approach are considered as trusted
entity, since their correct functionality is evaluated based on a
common criteria [34] certification process. That is, all security
critical operations performed by the SC in our approach can
be considered as being properly secured and correct.
B. Data Transfer Protocol
Configuration data in our approach needs to be transferred
using different untrusted channels (NFC, QR, WiFi, ...).
Therefore, security measures need to be applied to provide
data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. In addition to
that, information regarding configuration data is necessary
such that the IoT device’s SC is capable of deciding if a
configuration should be rejected or accepted and thus applied.
For NFC data transfer we implement a protocol based on
the NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) [35]. Due to the
low overhead of NDEF, we use the same data structure when
transferring data using QR-codes or a network connection.
Although NDEF provides some security measures such as
signatures [36], we did not rely on these measures since they
are insufficient and shown to be vulnerable to attacks [37].
Instead, confidential information in our approach is protected
by applying AE in the MAC-then-Encrypt mode that is also
used in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [38].
The complete structure of NDEF packets in our approach
including additional security related fields ins shown in
Fig. 7. All but the Cipher Spec field is protected by AE in
our approach. This field specifies the applied cryptographic
algorithm and key size used for AE. This information needs to
be transmitted unencrypted since it is required for decryption.
All other fields are contained in the encrypted payload.
Version: A version number identifying the specific configu-
ration version. The IoT device will reject configuration updates
with a configuration number less or equal to the currently
applied configuration.
Validity: If the current realtime of the IoT device is later
in time than the specified validity, a configuration update will
be rejected. For this check, we assume there is a secured time
source for the IoT device.
Encrypted
Payload
MAC
Cipher Spec
2 Byte
Plaintext
Sensor ID
4 Byte
Validity
4 Byte
Version
2 Byte
Fig. 7. NDEF packet structure used to protect configuration data.
AE verified?
Configuration Update
Sensor ID matches?
Version > 
curr Version?
Reject Update
Accept Update
Configuration
still valid?
Y Y Y
Y
NNNN
Fig. 8. Decision process of configuration update rejection or acceptance.
Device ID: If the specified device ID does not match the
actual device’s ID, the configuration is not indented for the
respective device and thus rejected.
MAC: The MAC corresponding to the transmitted plaintext.
It is calculated by a so-called one-way function [39] and is
part of the AE process.
Using the additional information together with AE, the IoT
device either rejects or accepts the configuration update. The
flowchart in Fig. 8 summarizes the decision process.
VI. PROTOTYPE
To evaluate the presented approach with respect to
feasibility, usability, and functionality we implemented a
prototype comprising the presented security measures in
hardware and software. This prototype, shown in Fig. 9
consists of the following components:
Sensor/Actuator: An air pressure sensor without any actu-
ator is used to represent the IoT device’s functionality.
General Purpose Controller: An Infineon XMC4500 mi-
crocontroller from the Cortex M4 family was used as a general
purpose controller. This microcontroller provides connection
interfaces such as USB, I2C, and Ethernet.
SC: As SC, an Infineon SLE78 that is CC EAL5+ certi-
fied was used. The SC is connected to the general purpose
controller via I2C. The SLE78 SC provides security features
such as secured data storage and code execution while also
including a contactless interface for NFC communication.
Mobile Configuration Device: We used an off-the-shelf
Nexus S mobile phone as NFC-enabled mobile configuration
device. The device is running Android 4.1.2 Jelly Bean to
use API level 14 and above that supports the latest NDEF
functionality of Android.
Configuration Back-End: The configuration back-end that
is not pictured in Fig. 9 was realized on a standard Windows
PC in this prototype. The required functionality is written in
NodeJS such that any computer that is capable of running
JavaScript can run the back-end.
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General Purpose 
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Security Controller
SLE78
NFC Interface to 
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Connected Sensor
Fig. 9. NFC Enhancement prototype comprising of an Infineon XMC4500
microcontroller used as general purpose controller and an Infineon SLE78 SC.
A. Smart Factory Prototype
In addition to the prototype shown in Fig. 9 we also present
a prototypical smart factory use case in which we evaluated
our presented approach. The evaluation is done in an Indus-
trie 4.0 [40] inspired smart factory setting that is simulated
in the RoboCup Logistics League (RCLL) [41]. The league
is intended as a testbed for smart factory inspired robotic
solutions where a number of autonomous mobile robots need
to transport semi-finished and finished individualized products
between production machines. In this process, robots also
need to configure machines such that the desired products
are manufactured. The configuration in this context is done
using wireless communication. The main issues with wireless
communication in industrial settings are realtime capability
and reliability [42]. Reliability of wireless communication is
most often compromised by interference of various technolo-
gies operating in the same frequency spectrum [43]. Especially
the 2.4GHz and 5GHz spectra are used by many technologies
such as WiFi, Bluetooth, or wireless phones. Hence, when
using these technologies interference is a common problem.
We applied the NFC-based configuration approach pre-
sented in this paper to the RCLL context and used an ex-
isting simulation environment [44] that we extended such that
NFC related characteristics could be simulated [45]. Using
this simulation environment, we investigated if the achieved
production capacity of a system is negatively influenced if
our NFC-based approach is used instead of WiFi. Fig. 10
shows the prototype during a simulation run. Since the point-
to-point performance of our approach is comparable to WiFi
(see Section VII), no drawback in terms of production capacity
could be observed. However, due to the limited communication
range of NFC, interference caused by robots simultaneously
configuring machines was reduced, and thus, the reliability of
machine configuration could be improved.
NFC Enhancement
Host
Controller
Security
Controller
NFC
I²C
ETH
NFC
Fig. 10. Simulated smart factory prototype in RCLL environment.
VII. EVALUATION
In addition to the presented prototype that demonstrates the
feasibility and usability of our presented approach, we also
evaluated the provided security level, the overhead, and the
performance of our approach.
A. Security Analysis
To demonstrate the security improvements achieved by the
implemented security measures in our approach, we present
a comprehensive security analysis. In this analysis, we list
involved Entities, Assets that are threatened and need to be
protected, the Threats, Countermeasures applied to mitigate
these threats, and Residual Risks for threats that cannot be
mitigated. We also list Assumptions that are made in the
context of this analysis. An overview of the security analysis
in Goal Structure Notation (GSN) is shown in Fig. 11. In
this notation, the threats for each asset are highlighted. In
addition, for each threat existing countermeasures or residual
risks are shown. The assets that are protected by our secured
configuration approach are: (A1) Configuration Data: Since
configuration data may contain confidential information
such as keys, the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity
of this information needs to be protected. (A2) Device
Functionality: Correct functionality of IoT devices must
not be compromised due to the inclusion of our proposed
configuration interface. That is, any attack targeting this
interface must not disturb proper operation of the device.
Threats for these assets can be posted by the following
entities: (E1) IoT Device Manufacturer: The manufacturer
of the device. Manufacturing includes all components such as
sensors, actuators, and NFC enhancement. (E2) IoT Device
Owner: Any user that is in possession of the IoT device and
thus, allowed to make configuration changes. (E3) Person
Applying Configuration Updates: Any person that is trying
to apply configuration updates at the IoT device. This could
be a different person than the device owner, especially in
industrial settings. (E4) Adversary: Any adversary that
can access the IoT device’s configuration interface, either
remotely or physically.
Before investigating potential threats, certain assumptions
are made in order to restrict the scope of this threat analysis:
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(As1) Configuration Back-End: The configuration back-
end that maintains all current configurations is assumed
to be properly secured against any type of attack. (As2)
SC Certification: The SC used in the NFC Enhancement
component is assumed to be certified to a CC security level
of at least EAL5+ and thus, is capable of mitigating physical
attacks.
Considering all identified assets, entities, and corresponding
assumptions our approach is now analyzed regarding potential
threats. For each threat, one or multiple countermeasures and
potential residual risks will be given. (T1) Backdoors: There
might be intentional or unintentional backdoors included in
the configuration interfaces hardware or software. (C1) CC
Certification: The CC certification process investigates and
mitigates this type of threat. (T2) Weak Cryptographic
Algorithms: The algorithms used in the configuration
approach might be susceptible to attacks due to weaknesses
in the used algorithm or due to using too short keys. (C1)
CC Certification: The CC certification process investigates
and mitigates this type of threat. (T3) Bugs: Security related
functionality implemented by the manufacturer might include
weaknesses or even bugs. (C1) CC Certification: The CC
certification process investigates and mitigates this type of
threat. (T4) Security Breach: Initial keys stored by the
manufacturer could be lost in a security breach or disclosed
in any other form, intentional or unintentional. (C2) Easy
Configuration: Changing configuration parameters such
as the initial key can be easily performed by users. (R1)
No Update: If the initial key is not updated, this threat
cannot be mitigated. (T5) Eavesdropping Configuration
Data: An adversary might try to eavesdrop configuration
data and thus, learn confidential information. (C3) Security
Measures: The security measures presented in this publication
provide effective mitigation of this threat. (T6) Manipulate
Configuration Data: An adversary might try to manipulate
transferred configuration data, either while being transferred
from configuration back-end to mobile configuration device,
or while being transferred from mobile configuration device
to IoT device. (C3) Security Measures: The security
measures presented in this publication provide effective
mitigation of this threat. (T7) Malicious Configuration: An
adversary might try to apply outdated configuration data or
configuration data that is intended for a different device. (C3)
Security Measures: The security measures presented in this
publication provide effective mitigation of this threat. (T8)
No Update: A malicious user does not apply any necessary
update. Thus, he basically performs a denial-of-service (DoS)
attack targeting the IoT device’s correct functionality. (R2)
No Countermeasure: Our approach cannot provide any
countermeasure against users that do not apply intended
updates. (T9) DoS Attack: An adversary might try to
perform DoS attacks targeting the configuration interface.
(C4) Security Measures and Proximity: The security
measures presented in this publication provide effective
mitigation of this threat. In addition, DoS attacks targeting the
configuration interface can only be performed by adversaries
in close proximity to the IoT device. (T10) Physical Attacks:
Fig. 11. Security analysis in GSN.
An adversary that has physical access to the IoT device
might try to reveal confidential information by performing
physical attacks on the device. (C1) CC Certification: The
CC certification process investigates and mitigates this type
of threat.
The list of discussed threats as well as the respective
countermeasures and residual risks is not exhaustive by any
means, but it reflects the threats that we consider as most
crucial for the presented NFC-based configuration approach.
Of the eleven identified threats, nine can be effectively miti-
gated while residual risks remain only for two threats. This
highlights the improved level of security provided by the
presented configuration approach.
B. Overhead and Performance
The implemented security measures in the NDEF protocol
(see Section V-B) entail an overhead of transferred data.
This overhead can be split into a static part (Ostatic) and a
variable part (Ovariable). The static overhead resulting from
the additionally included information (cipher spec, version,
validity, and sensor ID) can easily be calculated by summing
up the field sizes specified in Fig. 7.
Ostatic = 2B + 2B + 4B + 4B = 12B (1)
The variable overhead depends on the selected crypto-
graphic algorithms and the corresponding key sizes. For this
evaluation, we assume a MAC length of 32B. In addition to
that, also the padding required by block ciphers needs to be
accounted for. For this evaluation, we assume AES that has
a block size of 16B which entails an overhead due to the
padding of 0B - 15B. The total overhead O is then calculated
by summing up all incidental overheads.
O = Ostatic +Odynamic (2)
An overview of the resulting overhead relative to the
transferred configuration data size up to 4 kB is shown
in Fig. 12. The sawtooth pattern results from the varying
padding overhead that oscillates in the range of 0B - 15B.
For typical configuration sizes of 300B, less than 15% of the
transferred data will result from security imposed overhead.
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JRFID.2017.2745510
Copyright (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
IEEE JOURNAL ON RFID 9
100 101 102 103
Plaintext Size in Byte
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
O
ve
rh
ea
d 
in
 %
Fig. 12. Percentage of overhead relative to transferred configuration data.
To evaluate the performance of our approach, we measured
the time that was required to transfer a configuration package
with a typical size of 300B. The complete data transfer
including key agreement, encryption and decryption, and
configuration acceptance/rejection decision process requires
roughly 350ms. Compared to that, transmitting the same
amount of data using a secured TLS channel over a direct WiFi
connection between two Raspberry PIs takes roughly 200ms.
However, it has to be considered that the processing power
of a Raspberry PI is by far larger than the used components
in our prototype and that a direct WiFi connection was used
between the devices. Therefore, the timing difference between
these two approaches can be assumed as negligible.
VIII. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a secured NFC-based configuration
approach that is suitable for personal and industrial IoT de-
vices alike. To account for the different requirements in these
two domains, we present different configuration mechanisms
that provide different advantages and disadvantages. In order
to provide data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity we
present security measures in hardware and software. The NFC
enhancement component we present, can be used for new and
retrofit IoT devices. The NDEF based protocol we present is
secured by applying authenticated encryption in combination
with additional information that is used to validate configu-
ration data. The feasibility and usability of our approach are
demonstrated by two prototypes, while the provided security,
the resulting overhead, and the performance are also evaluated.
As future work, we plan to further extend our approach such
that the correct change of configuration data can be attested
in our system.
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